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FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF 
MARGARET A. BERGER 
 
Introduction 
Edward K. Cheng† 
It is my privilege to introduce this special issue of the 
Brooklyn Law Review in honor of my colleague and mentor, 
Margaret A. Berger. When Margaret announced her retirement 
from almost forty years of teaching at Brooklyn Law School, 
many of us were at a loss as to what to do. Naturally, as local 
tradition dictates, there would be a retirement dinner, 
complete with toasts from colleagues and family, speeches by 
former students, and the unveiling of a portrait. But for 
Margaret, the occasion seemed to demand something extra, 
something to acknowledge her remarkable contributions to the 
law of evidence and her eminent place in the field.  
Out of that vaguely unsettled feeling, Larry Solan and I, 
in consultation with our dean, Joan Wexler, arrived at a 
“festschrift.” Using foreign phrases of course has its dangers, 
and throughout this process the Berger “Festschrift” has not 
infrequently been greeted with puzzled looks and tentative 
pronunciations. In concept though, everyone has perfectly 
understood not only what it is, but also why it is a perfect fit 
for Margaret’s retirement. A new collection of works on the law 
of evidence looking not only at the past, but also to the future—
what better way to celebrate Margaret’s career? 
Margaret’s career in the law of evidence has spanned 
the full breadth of the discipline. As a scholar, she has co-
authored (with Judge Jack Weinstein) arguably the preeminent 
  
 † Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I want to thank all of the 
festschrift participants for their time and effort in making this celebration possible; 
Andrei Takhteyev, Joe Roy, and the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review for their 
tireless efforts in editing this issue; and Larry Solan and Joan Wexler for their support. 
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treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as written a 
number of influential law review articles. As a teacher, she has 
co-authored a leading evidence casebook, enlightened 
generations of students, and educated judges about the 
complexities of science with her now-famous Science for Judges 
conferences. As a lawyer, she has written amicus briefs to the 
Supreme Court and served on pathbreaking committees of the 
National Academy of Sciences. And as a member of the 
academic community, Margaret has embraced her role as part 
of the vanguard for women in the legal academy, and she has 
served as an important role model for young scholars female 
and male alike. 
Befitting a career of such incredible scope, sixteen 
evidence scholars make their contributions in this festschrift 
issue. The word “festschrift” comes from the German, which 
can be literally translated as “party writing” or “festival 
writing” and this festschrift lives up to that name. As with 
most parties (good ones, at least), the sounds emanating from 
this festschrift are celebratory, boisterous, and more 
importantly, polyphonous. The articles run the gamut of 
modern evidence law.  
The festschrift begins with three tributes. Judge Jack 
Weinstein is a natural tribute writer for any evidence scholar, 
but his tribute is a particularly fitting one in this case. After 
all, Margaret was not only Judge Weinstein’s first law clerk, 
but she has collaborated with him for years on both their 
treatise and casebook. Eleanor Swift writes a moving tribute to 
Margaret’s impact on women teaching in the field of evidence, 
and Larry Solan writes one as her long time colleague at 
Brooklyn Law School.  
As might be expected given Margaret’s scholarly focus 
over the last two decades, scientific evidence articles comprise 
the lion’s share of this issue. Jennifer Mnookin, who delivered 
the Ira M. Belfer Lecture that preceded Margaret’s retirement 
dinner, considers the problems facing the forensic identification 
sciences. She devotes considerable effort addressing a key 
question left largely unexplored by the recent National 
Academy of Sciences report—how should courts respond to the 
problems found in forensic science?  
The forensic themes of the Mnookin lecture surface in 
other contributions. Paul Giannelli, for example, chronicles 
Margaret’s involvement in the three biggest events in the 
recent history of forensic science—the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the 
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acceptance of DNA evidence in the courtroom, and the recent 
National Academy of Sciences report. Ed Imwinkelried 
continues this vein by exploring Margaret’s role as amicus 
curiae in both Daubert and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.  
A different variation on the forensic theme appears in 
David Kaye’s contribution, which responds to a recent article 
by Jay Koehler and Michael Saks on the “individualization 
fallacy” in the forensic sciences. Kaye contends that they 
overstate their claim. Koehler and Saks in turn write a 
contribution in response. 
In other scientific evidence pieces, an interesting thread 
emerges among several articles that highlights the tension 
between the general nature of science and the particularized 
nature of legal inquiry. As David Faigman notes in his 
contribution, this “evidentiary incommensurability” lies at the 
root of the tension between science and law, and he provides a 
useful taxonomy for navigating the terrain. Joe Sanders takes 
this dichotomy in a different direction, using it to explain the 
longstanding conundrum of why courts seemingly apply 
Daubert more strictly in civil cases than in criminal ones. I also 
rely heavily on the distinction in my contribution, which argues 
that scientific facts should be treated not like ordinary 
adjudicative facts but rather like foreign law.  
Beyond scientific evidence, other evidentiary concerns 
and doctrines make appearances as well. Michael Risinger goes 
back to basics, arguing that reform of the evidentiary rules 
should strive to improve accuracy, as determined through a 
combination of empirical evidence and common sense. In 
contrast, Aviva Orenstein tackles a specific evidentiary bête 
noire, advocating that the rule governing past convictions for 
crimes of deceit under Rule 609(b) should be subject to a 
judicial balancing test like Rule 403. 
Three contributions comment on the Confrontation 
Clause, motivated in part by Margaret’s pre-Crawford work on 
confrontation issues: her 1992 article discussing the 
Confrontation Clause implications of statements solicited by 
government actors, and her amicus briefs in Idaho v. Wright 
and Lilly v. Virginia. Bob Mosteller argues that informant 
testimony should be recorded in “draft form” to reveal the 
potential influence of government agents. Norman Abrams 
writes about the implications of Davis v. Washington’s “ongoing 
emergency” qualification to the Confrontation Clause for 
terrorism prosecutions and government attempts to gain 
information for intelligence purposes. Myrna Raeder discusses 
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the future of forfeiture doctrine in domestic violence cases in 
the wake of Giles v. California. 
Finally, no festschrift in honor of Margaret could be 
complete without some words about teaching, and Roger Park 
kindly obliges with his reflections on “clickers.” With its often 
technical yet deterministic rules as well as its link to real-time 
courtroom objections, Evidence may be the most amenable 
among law school survey courses to the “clicker” revolution. 
Park offers one example of how to inject “clicker” technology 
into the classroom successfully. 
* * * 
So this festschrift is polyphonous indeed. And although 
detractors sometimes characterize the field of evidence as a 
narrow set of arcane rules—perhaps even a narrow set of 
irrelevant rules given the death of the trial—this celebration 
shows the field to be vibrant and wide-ranging. This result 
should come as no surprise. After all, the process of proof and 
the rules that govern it are not only fundamental to legal 
inquiry, but also necessarily reflect our deepest values. 
A final word of thanks. Although the footnote at the 
beginning of this introduction acknowledges all of the people 
who made this festschrift possible, I purposely made one 
glaring omission, saving the best for last. I think it safe to say 
that all of the participants, as well as everyone else in the field 
of evidence, would gladly join me in thanking Margaret for 
dedicating her career to our field and helping make it what it is 
today. It is our great fortune to have her as a colleague and 
friend, and we look forward to her new contributions for many 
years to come. 
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TRIBUTES TO PROFESSOR 
MARGARET A. BERGER 
 
Tribute 
The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein† 
How fortunate are those of us whose lives have been 
enriched by Margaret Berger. 
A superb classroom teacher of civil procedure, evidence, 
mass torts, and science and the law, she has provided the basis 
for professional success, a life of the intellect, and the ethical 
practice of law for thousands of her students. 
For hundreds of state and federal judges, scientists, and 
government administrators of science-based programs, she has 
presented an extraordinary series of seminars and working 
sessions that have measurably improved the capacity of lawyers, 
scientists, and government officials to administer the law. 
Colleagues in teaching and practicing lawyers and 
judges have been grateful for her influential casebooks, 
treatises, and articles. 
To her many friends, she epitomizes the supportive, 
enchanting, engaged personal relationships that add sweetness 
to life even in its most trying hours. 
And there is yet another dimension that is at the core of 
this uncommon woman. It is glimpsed from time to time by 
those who have had the pleasure of visiting her home. There she 
presides with warm elegance in her beautifully old-world 
furnished apartment in midtown Manhattan and her suburban 
house by the sea. Margaret, along with Mark, her late husband, 
a well known general practitioner, and their sons, Josh, a T.V. 
stage manager, and David, a boutique firm litigator, have often 
  
 † Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York. 
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invited students, colleagues, and friends to share their beautiful 
and bountiful table and cultured conversation. 
It has been my privilege and honor to know Margaret 
Berger. She was my student (and thus my teacher) and my first 
law clerk. We have been coauthors and joint instructors. She 
has been a dear friend for over half a century. My bias in her 
favor is no disqualification from participating in this well 
deserved Berger Festschrift and dinner in her honor. As 
demonstrated by this outpouring of affection and by the many 
tributes to her and her Science for Judges programs in the 
sixteenth volume of the Journal of Law and Policy, legions will 
confirm that here partiality is mandated by truth. 
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Tribute 
Lawrence M. Solan† 
Margaret Berger and I have been colleagues at Brooklyn 
Law School since I joined the faculty in 1996. In the beginning, 
I really didn’t know what to make of her. Some people are best 
described as “no-nonsense,” others as “warm and friendly,” still 
others as “brutally honest.” Margaret is all of those things 
among others, and sees no conflict among them. She is a 
complex and brilliant woman. I learned this about her fairly 
quickly, and we soon became close friends. 
I know Margaret’s work well, and have even been 
fortunate enough to have written with her, which I hope to do 
again. Her work reveals a tightly argued, yet compassionate 
vision of the law. To take one example: Legal scholars have 
been concerned about the fact that there is not enough science 
in what passes as scientific evidence. Margaret has been part of 
this movement. But at the same time, Margaret has forged 
another, contrarian movement, whose theme is that the fetish 
of unattainable scientific certainty is being used by the courts 
to ensure that those injured by chemical and pharmaceutical 
products cannot recover for their injuries. That is because the 
courts require scientific proof of causation that is stricter than 
the scientific community can generally provide.  
Margaret proposes changes in the substantive law, as 
well as the law of evidence and procedure, the latter two of 
which she regards as parts of the same package. She not only 
sees the big picture, but she is willing to paint a new one if that 
is what is needed. 
For those who know how deeply Margaret has devoted 
herself to music, opera, and theater (for most of her life with 
her late husband, Mark), it should not be surprising that her 
work is as humanistic as it is intellectually crisp. I can’t say 
with scientific certainty that Margaret Berger is one of a kind, 
  
 † Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Don Forchelli Professor of Law, 
Brooklyn Law School. 
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but I’ve been attempting to falsify that hypothesis for some 
time, and have come up empty so far. 
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Tribute 
Eleanor Swift† 
For women teaching in the field of evidence law, 
Professor Margaret Berger’s career shines as a beacon—a 
stellar teacher, a highly-respected scholar of scientific 
evidentiary issues, co-author of the most venerated of evidence 
casebooks, co-author of the foundational treatise on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, consultant to courts, private and 
government commissions too numerous to mention, and 
Reporter to (among other august institutions) the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. She has broken 
every glass ceiling in academia. 
It could not have always been easy. Margaret entered 
the legal profession at a time when women were not hired by 
major New York law firms. She entered law teaching just as 
women were becoming a significant presence in law school 
student bodies, but not yet in law school faculties. And in the 
field of evidence law, male professors were iconic figures. Yet I 
wonder whether Margaret would ever admit how hard it was. 
She would probably give her characteristic “shrug” to 
underplay her own remarkable achievements. 
These achievements paved the way for women who 
followed her into the academic profession and into the field of 
evidence law. It is easier not to be the first, even though 
Margaret always set such a high standard. Even her 
introductions are masterpieces, as those who heard her 
remarks about Judge Weinstein at the AALS Evidence Section 
Luncheon in 2008 well remember. And she paved the way with 
her own brand of fellowship as well as her own achievements. 
At every major Evidence conference, at which she was always 
an invited speaker, Margaret welcomed us. She shared her 
inquiring mind with us, immediately treating us as colleagues 
instead of newcomers. 
It is her combination of fellowship and accomplishment 
that I have admired from near and afar for more than twenty 
  
 † Professor of Law, University of California, School of Law. 
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years. I know this admiration is shared by countless other 
women (and men too) who have been similarly inspired by 
Professor Margaret Berger. 
